Compiled by
Eddie Yeghiayan
"A Chaitin Randomness in Quantum Mechanics Without the Collapse Postulate." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. [Forthcoming]
"The Distribution Postulate in Bohm's Theory." Topoi (March 1995), 14(1):45-54.
"Empirical Adequacy and the Availability of Reliable Records in Quantum Mechanics." Philosophy of Science (March 1996), 63(1):49-64.
(with Frank Arntzenius.) "An Infinite Decision Puzzle." Theory and Decision (February 1996), 46(1):101-103.
(with J. McKenzie Alexander.) "Introduction." Philosophy of Science (September 2001), 68(3, Supplement):vii.
Introduction to the "Quantum Mechanics and the Measurement Problem" issue of Topoi (March 1995), 14(1):1-6.
"Is the Many-Histories Version of Quantum Mechanics Satisfactory?" Topoi. [Forthcoming]
"On Everett's Formulation of Quantum Mechanics--Interpretation of Wave-Function." Monist (January 1997), 80(1):70-96.
"On the Nature of Experience in the Bare Theory." Synthese (1998), 113(3):347-355.
(with David Z. Albert.) "On What It Takes to Be a World." Topoi (March 1995), 14(1):35-37.
"Oracles, Aesthetics, and Bayesian Consensus." Philosophy of Science (September 1996), 63(3, Supplement):S273-S280.
"The Persistence of Memory: Surreal Trajectories in Bohm's Theory." Philosophy of Science (December 2000), 67(4):680-703.
Guest Editor. Topos: "Quantum Mechanics and the Measurement Problem." Topoi (March 1995), 14(1).
The Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds.
Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Contents:
1. A Brief Introduction
2. The Standard Formulation of Quantum Mechanics
3. The Theory of the Universal Wave Function
4. The Bare Theory and Determinate Experience
5. Selecting a Branch
6. Many Worlds
7. Many Minds
8. Many Histories
9. The Determinate-Experience Problem
App. A. The Hilbert-Space Formalism
App. B. A Concrete Example of an EPR Experiment in the Context of the
Bare Theory
"The standard theory of quantum mechanics is in one sense
the most successful physical theory ever, predicting
the
behavior of the basic constituents of all physical
things;
no other theory has ever made such accurate empirical
predictions. However, if one tries to understand the
theory
as providing a complete and accurate framework for the
description of the behavior of all physical
interactions,
it becomes evident that the theory is ambiguous, or
even
logically inconsistent. The most notable attempt to
formulate the theory so as to deal with this problem,
the
quantum measurement problem, was initiated by Hugh
Everett
III in the 1950s. Barrett gives a careful and
challenging
examination and evaluation of the work of Everett and
those who have followed him. His informal approach, minimizing
technicality, will make the book accessible and
illuminating
for philosophers and physicists alike. Anyone
interested in
the interpretation of quantum mechanics should read
it."--
Book cover blurb.
"Quantum Mechanics Without the Collapse Postulate."
PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 1992.
Abstract in
Dissertation Abstracts International (July 1993), 54(1A):201-A.
Review of David Hodgson's The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Philosophical Review (April 1994), 103(2):350-353.
Review of Daniel F. Styer's The Strange World of Quantum Mechanics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (June 2001), 52(2):393-396.
Review of James T. Cushing's Philosophical Concepts in Physics: The Historical Relation between Philosophy and Scientific Theories. Isis (December 2000), 91(4):839-840.
Review of Jeffrey Bub's Interpreting the Quantum World. Isis (March 2000), 9(1):188-189.
"The Single-Mind and Many-Minds Versions of Quantum Mechanics." Erkenntnis (January 1995), 42(1):89-105.
"The Suggestive Properties of Quantum Mechanics Without the Collapse Postulate." Erkenntnis (September 1994), 41(2): 233-252.
"The Suggestive Properties of the Bare Theory." Synthese. [Forthcoming]
Butterfield, Jeremy. European Journal of Philosophy (August
2001),
9(2):230-234.
Kincannon, E. Choice (November 2000), 38(3):570.
Saunders, Simon. Mind (October 2001), 110(440):1039-1043.
Clifton, Robert. "On What Being a World Takes Away." Proceedings of the Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association (September 1996), 3(Supplement):S151-S159.
Machina, Mark J. "Barrett and Arntzenius's Infinite Decision Puzzle." Theory and Decision (November 2000), 49(3):293-297.
Pulier, Myron L. "A Flawed Infinite Decision Puzzle." Theory and Decision (November 2000), 49(3):291-292.
[ UCI Department of Logic & Philosophy of Science | UCI Department of Philosophy]